On May 23, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 7-1 decision in Green v. Brennan. The Court held that the statute of limitations for a constructive discharge claim under Title VII doesn’t begin to run until the day of the employee’s notice of resignation.
This case stems from a Title VII claim of constructive discharge, when an individual is “discriminated against by his employer to the point where a reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to resign.” As the petitioner was a federal employee, he could not file a lawsuit until he exhausted the administrative remedies available to him, in this case contacting an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) counselor, within 45 days of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.
The petitioner, Marvin Green, an employee with the United States Postal Service, complained to USPS that he was denied a promotion because of his race. Following his complaint, his supervisors accused him of the crime of intentionally delaying the mail. The parties entered into agreement in which Green promised to leave his post in Englewood, Colorado by March 31, 2010 and USPS agreed not to pursue criminal charges against Green. Green then submitted his resignation on February 9, 2010, effective on March 31, 2010, and contacted an EEO counselor on March 22, 41 days after his resignation notice, but 96 days after signing the initial agreement.
Green filed suit in Federal District Court soon after, but the Postal Service’s motion for summary judgment was granted because he had failed to contact the EEO counselor within 45 days of the initial agreement. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision, ruling that the “matter alleged to be discriminatory” was the agreement between Green and the Postal Service, and not his decision to resign.
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit’s judgment and held that the limitations period for a constructive discharge claim should only begin to run after a plaintiff gives notice of his or her resignation. The Court ruled that a claim of constructive discharge must have two basic elements: discrimination by the employer so severe that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would also be compelled to resign, and actual resignation. Since it is a two-factor claim, the statute of limitations cannot begin to run until the second element has taken place, the resignation. The Court clarified that an, “… employee resigns when he gives the employer definite notice of his intent to resign.”
FHKA monitors these developments as it routinely advises and defends employers in employment litigation both before the EEOC/OCRC and in courts. Feel free to contact any FHKA attorney with any questions.