The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that an employee who suffered from anxiety attacks could not establish that she was “otherwise qualified” to perform the duties of a customer service representative (“CSR”). Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 847 F.3d 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2017). Thus, dismissal of the employee’s Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim was affirmed.
Kirsten Williams was hired as a CSR for AT&T in 2007. CSR’s are required to remain at their workstations receiving calls, except during a scheduled lunch break, two scheduled 15-minute breaks, and restroom breaks as needed. Citing potentially longer customer wait times and increased workplace tension, AT&T has strict attendance policies that assess “attendance points” for unscheduled late arrivals and absences from work. These points do not apply to absences under the company’s short term disability leave (“STD”), FMLA leave, or approved ADA accommodations.
For the duration of Williams’ employment with AT&T, she had chronic problems with absenteeism. In 2013, she did not work from January to July, using STD and FMLA leave; she then worked a few days in August before returning to STD leave in September, on which she remained for all of October and most of November and December. She returned on January 20th and was warned about her poor attendance record, as she had accumulated nearly enough attendance points for termination. She worked only “sporadically” after March 11th and did not work at all from early April until her termination in July 2014. Portions of this leave fell under the employer’s leave policies and were not counted against her. Despite these exclusions, Williams accumulated double the amount of absence points necessary to terminate her employment under the policy.
In 2014, Williams requested an accommodation for her disability, which included STD coverage for past periods of absence and “intermittent time off moving forward.” This was clarified later to mean starting her shift 30 to 60 minutes later each day. The employer closed the accommodation request, because Williams failed to timely submit medical information. In April, a nurse practitioner submitted a medical report estimating that Williams needed 25 hours off work per month from February to August of 2014. Additionally, the report recommended that she be afforded a 10-minute break every 2 hours, a “flexible start time,” and “modified break time during anxiety attacks.”
Williams also provided medical documentation that she was in therapy from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. daily, which would continue until mid-June. This documentation noted that Williams was “not fit to work at this time,” but she could return to work at the end of her treatment if released to do so at that time. On June 20th, medical documentation stated that her treatment was projected to continue until August 6th.
Williams obtained a right to sue letter from the EEOC. She then filed a complaint against AT&T for failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process of determining an accommodation, and unlawful termination based on disability.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Williams was unqualified without an accommodation, and that she failed to propose a reasonable accommodation that would have allowed her to perform the essential functions of her job. The employee provided no evidence that breaks every two hours would address her anxiety condition and the employee proved unable to work at all for significant periods of time. Accordingly, the court found that she was not “otherwise qualified” under the ADA. Because Williams was not otherwise qualified, she could not sustain an action for alleged failure to engage in the interactive process or disparate treatment on the basis of her disability.
Williams shows that an employee’s recurring requests for large periods of disability leave are not always reasonable under the ADA. This opinion continues the Sixth Circuit’s position that “regular, in-person attendance is an essential function … of most jobs, especially interactive ones.” (quoting EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 762-63 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc)). Feel free to contact attorney David Riepenhoff at driepenhoff@fishelhass.com or (614) 221-1216 if you have any questions.