On December 3, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments on issues related to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The issue the court will decide is: “Whether, and in what circumstances, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), requires an employer that provides work accommodations to non-pregnant employees with work limitations to provide work accommodations to pregnant employees who are ‘similar in their ability or inability to work.’”
As discussed in FHKA’s October issue, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) released a number of guidelines regarding the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) in July of this year. The Guidelines require that employers treat employees affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition similarly to other employees who are not pregnant but are similarly unable to perform their jobs, whether by providing modified tasks, alternative assignments, leave, or other benefits. According to the Guidelines, employees with pregnancy-related conditions are required to have equal access to benefits as other employees with similar abilities or inabilities.
The question before the Supreme Court arises out of a case out of the Fourth Circuit, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. CIV.A. DKC 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, (D. Md.14, 2011) aff’d, 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013). In 2006, UPS denied light duty accommodations to a pregnant employee citing their policy of only extending light duty or reassignment to employees who were injured on the job or to employees qualifying as disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The 4th Circuit held the employee was not entitled to accommodation, finding that she was not disabled under the definition of the ADA nor was she “regarded as” disabled under the Act. UPS announced earlier this year that as a result of the EEOC Guidelines, effective January 1, 2015, the company would be extending light duty assignments to pregnant employees.
Currently, 6th Circuit precedent is inconsistent with the EEOC guidelines in regards to light duty. See Reeves v. Swift Transportation Company, Inc., 446 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2006). Based upon 6th Circuit precedent, employers are not necessarily obligated to provide light duty to a pregnant employee making such a request even though the EEOC Guidelines state otherwise. Rather, employers must continue to consistently follow existing policies and practices. Therefore, if an employer offers “light duty” only for an on-the-job injury through a wage continuation program, employers do not need to change their eligibility requirements, policies and/or practices.
The Supreme Court’s decision may change how the 6th Circuit addresses issues pertaining to light duty and could have a significant impact on entities required to make these accommodations.
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